Introduction

̶ Barack Obama
With these words to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, President Obama launched the United States' rebalance to Asia. 1 Shortly following the President's remarks,
Secretary of State Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy further elucidating the shift in
focus to the Asia-Pacific and outlining an Asian regional strategy based on six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights." 2 Also, in January 2012, the Department of Defense published its Priorities for 21st Century Defense that clearly communicated the intent to rebalance defense resources to the Asia-Pacific region. 3 But clear intent does not necessarily illuminate ways to successfully execute a resource rebalance. This paper will examine three examples from the NATO alliance construct that may serve as potential options to engage with Pacific partners, rebalance defense resources and successfully meet global security challenges.
Why the emphasis now on a pivot to Asia? Both President Obama and Secretary Clinton highlighted the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a moment of opportunity to refocus strategic priorities and defense resources: "As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point." 4 The U.S.
rebalance to Asia is not simply a matter of generating additional resources to meet the objective, or of wholesale moving of resources from one region of the globe to the Pacific. Decreasing defense requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with likely defense budget cuts provide a unique and historic opportunity to assess where to possibly shift and place defense resources to support the President's rebalance to Asia yet still maintain a Middle Eastern presence.
How best to do this? Secretary Clinton points to the answer with the first of her six key lines of action -alliances and partnerships. In her Foreign Policy article, she calls for more than a mere sustainment of U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, outlining three core principles for updating them: maintaining consensus on core political objectives, ensuring nimble and adaptive alliances that can successfully meet new challenges and opportunities, and guaranteeing "that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors."
5
Executing these three principles in the alliance construct does not have to be a case of reinventing the wheel. The U.S. has ready examples from other alliance partnerships to draw on as examples. "By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as There are three elements to Smart Defence:
• Prioritization -Aligning national capability priorities with those of NATO has been a challenge for some years. Smart defence is the opportunity for a transparent, cooperative and cost-effective approach to meet essential capability requirements.
• Specialization -With budgets under pressure, nations make unilateral decisions to abandon certain capabilities. When that happens the other nations fall under an increased obligation to maintain those capabilities. Such specialization "by default" is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO should encourage specialization "by design" so that members concentrate on their national strengths and agree to coordinate planned defence budget cuts with the Allies, while maintaining national sovereignty for their final decision.
• Cooperation -acting together, the nations can have access to capabilities which they could not afford individually, and achieve economies of scale. Cooperation may take different forms, such as a small group of nations led by a framework nation, or strategic sharing by those who are close in terms of geography, culture or common equipment. 8 Smart Defence includes "projects related to use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and it also looks toward improving joint logistics and maintenance. Other projects stress better force protection and better training."
9 NATO can build a security framework greater than the sum of its members' parts by coordinating resource prioritization and decisions to specialize (or no longer specialize) in certain capabilities and looking for innovative ways to cooperate and leverage member nations' strengths and capabilities. That security framework can provide a foundation, as it has for the past 63 years that enables stability and economic growth. "Security and economic wellbeing are While a complex and comprehensive operation like the one that NATO oversaw in Libya may not be currently possible in the Asia-Pacific region due to the lack of a multilateral and formal alliance framework built on many years of cooperation, this does not mean that the lessons learned from Libya are not of value. Alliance framework and relations built and maintained in times of peace are more apt to respond efficiently and effectively to a crisis. Ad hoc, as-needed coalitions do not have a common operating basis, be it doctrine, command structures, decision-making processes, capabilities, or operating methodologies because they are thrown together as the crisis unfolds. It would be like mixing soccer players from all levels and all countries together to play a World Cup match, without practicing or laying out a team strategy until the actual match begins. Ad hoc coalitions generally do not equally share the burdens; more often than not, one nation ends up shouldering the lion's share of the security load. 23 While the U.S. provided key capabilities to the Libya operation, it was not the lead, NATO was.
NATO operations in Libya thus provide a great example of the impact and value of efforts like Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative when it comes time to leverage the resources and capabilities of alliance members. By working together to pool resources and capabilities for the good of common security, allies can more effectively rise together to meet the challenges of crises of varying types. In the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. can leverage its relationships with its various allies to link them and build new combined partnerships to lay the groundwork for a Smart Defence type of resource pooling that can provide a wide-range of crisis response, not necessarily visibly or materially led by the U.S. itself. Relationships built in times of calm and peace can provide both a resource and operational framework that can be smoothly, seamlessly and effectively tapped into when a crisis arises. While a kinetic regime change scenario such as that in Libya may be a bit of a stretch at the present time in the Asia-Pacific, this type of construct is more applicable and likely to succeed in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and other such situations. The Libya operation also illustrates that the U.S. does not need to be the out-front leader of an operation. Rather its greater value may lie in providing the underlying critical support resources, and enabling partners and allies to take the lead role in their own backyard.
NATO-Russian Council
The U.S. pivot is often mistakenly seen as an effort to counter a rising China.
Approaching the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region in this manner runs counter to the President's intent and could become a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy. " [T] he United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship China…all of our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. That's why the United States welcomes it…we'll seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation." NATO itself, NRC is an organization built on member equality and consensus. "While differences between the Allies and Russia remain on some issues, the driving force behind the NRC's pragmatic spirit of cooperation is the realization that NRC members share common challenges, including Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural and man-made disasters." 25 While the NRC's goal may be a modern and strategic partnership, the current reality falls short of that. Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008, the U.S. interest in a ballistic missile defense system in Europe ostensibly to counter the threat from Iran, and the two countries' complex and intertwined relationships with the Middle East make for roadblocks to building partnerships. Despite these differences, the effort in partnership building has brought some degree of progress.
An example of shared NRC member interests put into action includes the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). CAI's "purpose is to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination against terrorist attacks using civilian aircraft, helping to enhance transparency, confidence and trust and to strengthen the capabilities required for the handling of security incidents." 26 Vigilant Skies 2012, the exercise conducted in mid-November tested and consolidated CAI Information Exchange System (IES) processes, procedures and capabilities, with the goal of Vigilant Skies 2013 unfolding as a live-fire exercise over the Black Sea area.
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From the perspective of both NATO and Russia, the exercise objectives were met and IES efficiencies confirmed. 
Recommendations
In review, this paper examined three ideas from NATO -the Smart Defence initiative, alliance operations in Libya and the alliance's NATO-Russia Council as potential examples of how the U.S. could successfully conduct, at least in part, its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative point to resource pooling and sharing amongst partner nations. While the alliance construct is not a factor in Asia, the common bond of bilateral alliances and relationships with the U.S. and the capabilities it brings to the table can link Asia allies together in a way that can more efficiently leverage the unique resources and capabilities of each. Doing this can allow the U.S. to identify and allot those resources it has that its Asian allies do not and shift those to the Pacific, aligning its global force structure to reflect the deficits of regional partners. NATO's operation in Libya put resource pooling into operational practice. It was by no means perfect, but it did show that working together to pool resources and capabilities in times of calm and peace leads to more efficient and effective operations in times of crisis. While a kinetic combat operation such as the Libyan regime change is likely a bridge too far in Asia, a similar construct could certainly be employed for humanitarian relief, disaster response, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, and other similar types of operations. Also, with the primacy of face prevalent in Asian culture, exploring ways that the U.S. can act in a supporting role in a resource-pooling construct as it did in Libya and as it currently is with France's operations in Mali would likely bear more fruit.
Regardless of whether or not the future of U.S. relations in Asia moves towards a NATOlike multilateral alliance or remains an association of smaller alliances linked by common ties to the U.S., fully engaging China is a key component. Applying the best examples of cooperation from the NATO-Russia Council, such as the Vigilant Skies exercises, while learning from the less-successful engagements and the reasons for them can provide the framework to build a cooperative relationship, be it bilateral or multilateral. Also, engaging China in humanitarian relief and disaster response exercises and logistical cooperation opportunities, along with other exercises to combine resources and train together can lead to more resource pooling and more effective use of both nation's capabilities in a time of crisis.
Conclusion
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, published in January 2012, provides a clear picture of the goals of the U.S. rebalance to Asia: "Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests." 31 Leveraging examples from one of the most-successful alliances in history may be the key in how to go about most effectively placing U.S. resources globally to secure those common interests.
Notes
